William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 35 | Issue 1

Article 12

2008

A Legislative Rejoinder to "Give Me Your Gays,
Your Lesbians, and Your Victims of Gender
Violence, Yearning to Breathe Free of Sexual
Persecution. . ."
Leonard Birdsong

Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
Recommended Citation
Birdsong, Leonard (2008) "A Legislative Rejoinder to "Give Me Your Gays, Your Lesbians, and Your Victims of Gender Violence,
Yearning to Breathe Free of Sexual Persecution. . ."," William Mitchell Law Review: Vol. 35: Iss. 1, Article 12.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss1/12

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law

Birdsong: A Legislative Rejoinder to "Give Me Your Gays, Your Lesbians, and

A LEGISLATIVE REJOINDER TO “GIVE ME YOUR GAYS,
YOUR LESBIANS, AND YOUR VICTIMS OF GENDER
VIOLENCE, YEARNING TO BREATHE FREE OF SEXUAL
PERSECUTION...”
†

Leonard Birdsong

I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................... 198
II. THE FOUNDATION FOR ASYLUM ............................................ 201
III. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROBLEMS ............................ 205
A. Statutory Terms: Unsettled Definitions............................... 205
1. Persecution................................................................. 205
a. Punitive Intent: The Ninth Circuit ........................ 207
b.
Punitive Intent: The Fifth Circuit .......................... 208
c.
Punitive Intent: The Seventh Circuit...................... 209
2. Social Group ............................................................... 210
B. Lack of Precedent and Published Opinions ........................ 212
IV. GUIDELINES, REGULATIONS, AND “FLOODGATE”
PROBLEMS FOR WOMEN ......................................................... 213
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS........................................................... 220
VI. THE MODEL LEGISLATION ..................................................... 223
VII. CONCLUSION ........................................................................ 224

† Leonard Birdsong is an Associate Professor of Law at Barry University
School of Law, Orlando, Florida. He received his B.A. (cum laude) at Howard
University and his J.D. from Harvard Law School. He teaches criminal law and
immigration law. He wishes to thank Barry Law School Reference Librarians Ann
Pascoe and Jennifer Greig for their valuable research assistance in preparation of
this article. He also thanks Professor Stanley Talcott for his encouragement with
respect to this article and Professor Frederick Jonassen for his comments on the
draft of this article. He wishes a special thanks to Dean Leticia Diaz for her
financial support by awarding a summer research grant from Barry University for
the completion of this project.

197

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008

1

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 12

198

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

I.

[Vol. 35:1

INTRODUCTION

In the last fifteen years there have been important advances in
aspects of American immigration law that protect lesbian, gay,
bisexual, and transgendered (LGBT) persons and women who may
have been victims of gender-based violence in their home
countries. Earlier immigration law legally excluded lesbian and gay
men because the medical and psychiatric communities believed
1
homosexuality was a disease.
We, as a country, are to be
commended for now extending grants of asylum to those who may
have experienced past persecution or who fear future persecution
in their countries of origin because of their sexual orientation or
victimization on account of gender violence. As this article will
demonstrate, such types of persecution may be considered together
and may be best described as “persecution based on sexual
orientation.”
One such recent case, typical of many, started in 2003, and
involved Gramoz Prestreshi, an eighteen year-old citizen of Kosovo
who was stalked and beaten almost to death by a group of local
2
thugs because he was a homosexual. Prestreshi was laughed at and
3
called names by the police to whom he reported his beating. In
the hospital emergency room he was made to mop up his own
4
blood. He had photographs taken of his injuries and complained
to the press about the hostile environment homosexuals endure in
5
6
Kosovo. His family later disowned him for his sexual orientation.
He joined a gay rights organization and in 2007 was granted asylum
in the United States on the grounds that his treatment in Kosovo
7
amounted to persecution.
1. See Alan G. Bennett, Note, The “Cure” that Harms: Sexual Orientation-Based
Asylum and the Changing Definition of Persecution, 29 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 279,
279 (1999) (citing Immigration Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-301, ch. 29, § 3, 39
Stat. 874, 875 (1917)). In 1990, Congress removed this impediment from the law
in the Immigration Act of 1990. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, §
601, 104 Stat. 4978, 5067-77 (1990). The statute simply eliminated “sexual
deviants” from its list of classes of excludable aliens. Id.
2. See Pamela Constable, Persecuted Gays Seek Refuge in U.S., WASH. POST, July
10, 2007, at A6.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. On October 30, 2007, the author confirmed this story in a telephone
interview with Todd Pilcher, an attorney with the Whitman-Walker Clinic in
Washington, D.C. who assisted Prestreshi in obtaining asylum.
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Although such grants of asylum are generally unknown to the
American public, this law professor and author is one of many who,
for the last few years, have taught and written about the
phenomenon of grants of asylum on the grounds of sexual
orientation and the problems involved in obtaining justice for
8
victims of such persecution. My earlier article, “Give Me Your Gays,
Your Lesbians, and Your Victims of Gender Violence, Yearning to Breathe
9
Free of Sexual Persecution...”: The New Grounds for Grants of Asylum,
consisted of an analysis of some of the problems of obtaining
justice in our asylum system for persons such as Gramoz Prestreshi
and other victims of persecution on the basis of sexual orientation.
The analysis of those problems revealed the need for several
solutions. First, it exposed the need for more consistency in
defining and interpreting our asylum law. Second, the U.S.
10
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) needs to better
formulate policies that might guarantee uniformly just results in
cases of those escaping persecution based on their sexual
orientation. Finally, the U.S. Justice Department needs to provide
more published opinions in sexual persecution cases as well as
better-trained and more sensitive immigration judges.
The article was written from the point of view of an author
who, earlier in his legal career, worked in the U.S. State
Department and later, while in private practice, represented many
different people in immigration court who sought asylum from
11
various kinds of persecution. A number of colleagues, students,
and former students have found the article informative and
interesting. Others did not care for the subject matter of the
8. In the late 1990s, two sets of helpful bibliographies on the subject were
published. See Ronald I. Mirvis, Political Asylum in the United States: A Selective
Bibliography, 54 THE RECORD 688 (1999); Elisa Mason, The Protection Concerns of
Refugee Women: A Bibliography, 9 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 95 (1999).
9. Leonard Birdsong, “Give Me Your Gays, Your Lesbians, and Your Victims of
Gender Violence, Yearning to Breathe Free of Sexual Persecution . . .”: The New Grounds for
Grants of Asylum, 32 NOVA L. REV. 357 (2008).
10. Created by a 2003 reorganization spurred by the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks, this department inherited most of the functions formerly carried
out by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). Those functions are
distributed among three DHS bureaus: CBP, ICE and USCIS. See DAVID A.
MARTIN, T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, HIROSHI MOTOMURA & MARYELLEN FULLERTON,
FORCED MIGRATION: LAW AND POLICY, at x (2007).
11. The author served as a State Department Foreign Service officer with
postings in Nigeria, Germany, the Bahamas, and Washington, D.C. during the late
1970s and 1980s. During the 1990s, while in private law practice in Washington,
D.C., a part of his practice involved representing clients with asylum claims.
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article and were surprised to find that “gays and lesbians” could be
granted asylum in the United States. The most cogent criticism of
the former article was directed at this author by a colleague who
opined that I, as one who has done asylum work and now teaches
about asylum trends, should be doing more to advance the law in
this area. This may be true. What the earlier article did not do was
to propose a solution to the problem by actually suggesting how
our asylum law may be rewritten to provide uniform justice to those
fleeing persecution because of their sexual orientations.
Thus, this article is a legislative rejoinder to my original article
regarding how and why our asylum statute may be better rewritten
or amended to ensure uniformity and justice to those fleeing
persecution based on sexual orientation. Part II of this article
12
provides a perspective on the foundation for asylum law. Part III
briefly explains a few of the problems in adjudicating asylum claims
based on persecution on account of sexual orientation within the
13
Part IV discusses the
current state of the law and regulations.
guidelines and proposed regulations for adjudicating asylum claims
for women who may have been persecuted by non-state
14
persecutors. Part V proposes five amendments to our asylum law
at section 101(a)(42) of the Immigration and Nationality Act that
will better provide justice to victims of persecution based on sexual
15
They include: 1) a comprehensive definition of
orientation.
“persecution”; 2) a rule that “punitive intent” on the part of the
persecutor is not a requirement for a finding of “persecution”; 3) a
definition of “particular social group” that is in accord with the
Ninth Circuit’s definition set out in the Hernandez-Montiel case; 4)
recognition in accord with international standards that women may
assert “persecution” on account of their gender as well as on the
other current statutory grounds; and 5) a requirement that the
Board of Immigration Appeals publish written opinions in cases
granting asylum in sexual persecution and coercive population
16
The article
control cases. Part VI is my model legislation.
concludes with the recommendation that the U.S. Congress
17
implement the amendments set out herein.

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.
See infra Part VII.
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II. THE FOUNDATION FOR ASYLUM
The foundation for our asylum law grew out of international
norms for refugee protection derived from the 1951 United
Nations Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
18
Refugees. The 1951 Convention provided protection for World
War II refugees, many of whom had been refugees displaced
19
because of Nazi atrocities. Future refugees were to be included in
20
the 1967 Protocol. The United States acceded to the Protocol in
21
1967, but Congress did not enact its own Refugee Act until 1980.
Our government codified the Protocol in the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) such that an applicant for asylum must be a
refugee outside one’s country of nationality and must meet the
22
following requirements: 1) the applicant must have a “well23
founded fear of persecution”; 2) the fear must be based on past
24
persecution or the risk of future persecution; and 3) the
persecution must be “on account of race, religion, nationality,
25
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”
The treaty and the law were of humanitarian concern, yet, for
those of us who have worked in the U.S. State Department it has
always been apparent that the United States adopted them, in part,
18. Under the 1951 Convention, the term “refugee” applies to:
[A]ny person who . . . owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality
and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being
outside the country of his former habitual residence . . . is unable or,
owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1A(2), July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 150, reprinted in GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL & JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 573 (3d ed. 2007).
19. See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 18, at 19, 35.
20. Id.; Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, Preamble, art. 1, para. 2,
Oct. 4, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, reprinted in GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 18, at 588.
21. See The Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006)).
22. See Immigration & Nationality Act (INA) § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(42)(A) (2006).
23. Id. An alien will be considered a refugee if she has suffered persecution
in the past on account of one of the statutory grounds or if she can show an
objectively reasonable fear of such persecution in the future. See 8 C.F.R. §
208.16(b)(2) (2008). See generally INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 427–28
(1987).
24. INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
25. Id.
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as tools that could be utilized in the Cold War fight against
communism. In the 1980s, the expected profile of the successful
candidate for asylum under the new law was generally a man who
may have spoken out against and was forced to flee the stringent
dictates of a communist or Marxist regime or a country whose
26
politics the United States did not approve. Much may be the same
today. The most successful candidates for political asylum tend to
be from countries that are communist and/or who have leaders
27
and policies of which we do not approve.
Today, China is one of our greatest trading partners, but the
28
leading country of origin for asylees to the United States. China is
29
still a communist country with coercive population policies. As a
result, in 1996, Congress expanded the definition of asylum to
provide that forced abortion, involuntary sterilization or resistance
to coercive population control programs were grounds for
30
The Cold War is
persecution on account of political opinion.
long over, yet asylum policy is often still used to fulfill our foreign
31
policy objectives. In the case of China, Congress chose to amend
26. GIL LOESCHER, BEYOND CHARITY: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE
GLOBAL REFUGEE CRISIS 20–23 (1993).
27. Recent statistics support this thesis. The total number of persons granted
asylum in the United States increased to 26,113 in 2006, from 25,160 in 2005. The
leading countries of origin of these asylees included China with 21.3 percent,
Columbia with 11.4 percent, and Venezuela with 5.2 percent. When Haiti's 11.5
percent are factored into this calculus, these four countries accounted for nearly
50 percent of all grants of asylum for 2006. See KELLY JEFFERYS, DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY, ANNUAL FLOW REPORT: REFUGEES AND ASYLEES: 2006, at 4
(2007),
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/Refugee_
Asyleesec508Compliant.pdf.
28. Id.
29. See Thomas L. Hunker, Generational Genocide: Coercive Population Control as
a Basis for Asylum in the United States, 15 FLA. ST. J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 131, 131–
32 (2005) (“[a]t the forefront of the controversy stands China’s so-called ‘one
child’ policy”); see also Kyle R. Rabkin, Comment, The Zero-Child Policy: How the
Board of Immigration Appeals Discriminates Against Unmarried Asylum-Seekers Fleeing
Coercive Family Planning Measures, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 965 (2007).
30. See INA § 101(a)(42)(B) which provides, in relevant part:
For purposes of determinations under this Act, a person who has been
forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary sterilization, or
who has been persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo such a
procedure or for other resistance to a coercive population control
program, shall be deemed to have been persecuted on account of
political opinion, and a person who has a well founded fear that he or
she will be forced to undergo such procedure or subject to persecution
for such failure, refusal, or resistance shall be deemed to have a well
founded fear of persecution on account of political opinion.
31. See generally Hunker, supra note 29, at 141–42 (“[i]n the latter part of the

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss1/12

6

Birdsong: A Legislative Rejoinder to "Give Me Your Gays, Your Lesbians, and

2008]

LEGISLATIVE REJOINDER: GENDER VIOLENCE

203

asylum law to show our disapproval of its human rights record with
respect to the use of abortion and other such coercive population
32
control measures. The increasing grants of asylum to citizens of
Venezuela based upon their political opinion in opposition to that
government is an implementation of our foreign policy reaction to
the political excesses of the Hugo Chavez regime and his anti33
American rantings.
Since grants of asylum in general are increasing, anecdotal
evidence indicates that there has been a concomitant increase of
such grants for persecution on account of sexual orientation or
34
The DHS does not disclose a detailed
gender-based violence.
record of the reasons for the grants of asylum, but legal advocacy
groups such as the Whitman-Walker Clinic in Washington, D.C.
and Immigration Equality in New York City have claimed to have
secured grants of asylum for numerous LGBT persons in the last
35
few years.
Grants of asylum based on persecution on account of sexual
orientation began in 1990 when the Board of Immigration Appeals
36
37
(BIA) affirmed an immigration judge’s (IJ’s) decision to
withhold deportation of a gay Cuban marielito in the case of In re

20th Century, the push to topple communism resulted in the fall of the Berlin
Wall . . . in addition, much of U.S. foreign policy reflected opposition to other
major Marxist regimes . . . anti-communism influences U.S. asylum policies.”).
32. See id. at 143 (“[i]t shows that most of Congress viewed section 601 as a
way to condemn Chinese human rights abuses . . .”).
33. See Tom Brown, Venezuelans, Fleeing Chavez, Seek U.S. Safety Net, REUTERS,
July 16, 2007,
http://www.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idUSN1127066720070716.
34. Interview with Todd Pilcher, Attorney, Whitman-Walker Clinic (Oct. 30,
2007); Interview with Victoria Neilson, Attorney & Legal Director, Immigration
Equality (Nov. 15, 2007). Both attorneys indicate that they have been involved
with an increase of successful sexual persecution asylum claims over the last few
years. Id.
35. Id. These are two of a number of organizations in the United States that
provide legal representation for LGBT persons and/or women seeking asylum
because of persecution on account of sexual orientation. See About WhitmanWalker Clinic: Our History, http://www.wwc.org/about_wwc/history.html (last
visited Dec. 12, 2008); IMEQ Mission, http://www.immigrationequality.org/
template.php?pageid=8 (last visited Dec. 13, 2008).
36. The Board of Immigration Appeals is a component of the Executive
Office for Immigration Review in the Department of Justice. See MARTIN ET AL.,
supra note 10.
37. The corps of immigration judges is a component of the Executive Office
for Immigration Review in the Department of Justice. See id. at xi.
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38

Toboso-Alfonso.
This was the first known instance in U.S.
immigration law where a homosexual was cast as a member of a
particular social group, namely that of Cuban gays, and permitted
to allege successfully persecution on that basis so as to conform
39
with the statutory definition found in the law. The Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) argued that homosexuality should
40
not be considered a particular social group. The BIA rejected this
41
argument. Four years later, then Attorney General Janet Reno
issued an order declaring that Toboso-Alfonso was to be considered
42
precedent in all proceedings involving the same issue or issues.
It is salient to note that the case involved a male fleeing
persecution from communist Cuba. The grant of asylum by the
BIA and its subsequent precedent setting order by the Attorney
General may have furthered our foreign policy objectives of
showing our disapproval of Castro’s human rights position in
general, and specifically, with respect to his persecution of
homosexuals. At the same time, the decision opened an avenue for
all victims of sexual persecution wherein they could seek asylum in
the United States. Whether such consequence was consciously
desired is debatable.
The seminal case with respect to women who are victims of
sexual persecution was decided in 1995 in the case of In re Fauziya
43
Kasinga.
In Kasinga, the BIA reversed an immigration court’s
denial of asylum for a young Togolese woman who fled her
44
homeland to escape female genital mutilation (FGM). The BIA
made very detailed and specific findings, but its most interesting
findings surrounded the adoption of the following standard:
“[T]he practice of female genital mutilation, which results in

38. See In re Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 823 (1990); Robert C.
Leitner, Note and Comments, A Flawed System Exposed: The Immigration Adjudicatory
System and Asylum for Sexual Minorities, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 679, 686 (2004). Fidel
Armando Toboso said that because he was gay, he was sentenced to sixty days in a
forced labor camp. Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 821. Later, at the time of the
Mariel boatlift, he was threatened by the Cuban government that if he did not
leave Cuba immediately he would have to serve four years in prison for being a
homosexual. Id.
39. In re Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 822–23.
40. Id. at 821.
41. Id. at 822–23.
42. Att’y Gen. Order No. 1895-94 (June 19, 1994).
43. 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (1996).
44. Id. at 358; see also Irena Lieberman, Women and Girls Facing Gender-Based
Violence and Asylum Jurisprudence, 29 HUM. RTS. 9, 9–10 (2002).
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permanent disfiguration and poses a risk of serious, potentially lifethreatening complications, can be the basis for a claim of
45
persecution.”
Thus, in very particular and finite cases, women
fleeing female genital mutilation may be granted asylum in the
United States based on a reasonable fear of persecution. The BIA
immediately designated the decision as precedent to be followed by
46
all 179 immigration courts in the country.
III. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROBLEMS
As stated in my earlier article, problems and inconsistencies
prevail in asylum adjudications for those persecuted on account of
sexual orientation for a number of reasons, including: A) lack of a
settled definition for certain statutory words, such as “persecution”
and “social group”; B) a split in circuit decisions with respect to the
necessity for a finding of punitive intent in the meaning of
persecution in asylum cases; and C) the lack of precedent and
published asylum decisions.
A. Statutory Terms: Unsettled Definitions
1.

Persecution

Under both asylum and withholding of deportation, the
claimant must show that she has been “persecuted” in the past or
will be “persecuted” in the future if forced to return to the country
47
of origin. Unfortunately, the statutes do not offer a definition of
45. Fauziya Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 357. The court also found that
“[y]oung women who are members of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu tribe of northern
Togo who have not been subjected to female genital mutilation, as practiced by
that tribe, and who oppose the practice, are recognized as members of a
‘particular social group’ within the . . . Immigration and Nationality Act.” Id.
46. Id. at 358 (“A fundamental issue before us is whether the practice of
female genital mutilation (“FGM”) can be the basis for a grant of asylum under
section 208 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1994) . . .
[w]e find that FGM can be a basis for asylum.”).
47. The applicable standard of proof is higher in a withholding of removal
than in an asylum grant. Prela v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 515, 519 (7th Cir. 2005). In
order to obtain withholding of removal the claimant must show a clear probability
of persecution. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430 (1987). The showing
for asylum is only a well-founded fear of persecution. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)
(2006). Asylum and withholding of removal appear nearly identical but have
important differences. Asylum is subject to the discretion of the Attorney General
of the United States. Id. § 1158(b)(1)(A). Withholding of removal, if proven, is a
mandatory form of relief. Pierre v. Rivkind, 825 F.2d 1501, 1504 (11th Cir. 1987).
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48

“persecution.” The Ninth Circuit has utilized a broad definition
of persecution as “the infliction of suffering or harm upon those
49
who differ . . . in a way regarded as offensive.” The First Circuit
has held that a brief detention on several occasions did not rise to
50
the level of persecution. Rather, persecution encompasses threats
to life or freedom, but it must be more than mere harassment or
51
annoyance.
The Third Circuit limits persecution to “threats to life,
confinement, torture, and economic restrictions so severe that they
52
constitute a threat to life or freedom.” The Ninth Circuit reminds
us that persecution must be inflicted either by the government or
by groups that the national government was unwilling or unable to
53
control. Where the source of the persecution is personal hostility,
it is considered outside of the realm of persecution for statutory
54
purposes and asylum is denied. This limitation on persecution is
particularly disadvantageous to women who are victims of gender
violence in cultures where conditions for many women are
55
“generally harsh,” and their basic rights are likely to be violated.
The asylum statute must first be amended to provide a
definition of “persecution” that will provide guidance for those
seeking relief from persecution.
Analysis of persecution requires IJs, the BIA, and the courts to
decide the motive of the persecutor. The Supreme Court held in
INS v. Elias-Zacarias that a claimant is not required to provide direct
proof of the persecutor’s motivations, but a claimant must produce
A person granted asylum may be eligible for permanent residency in the U.S. after
one year as an asylee. 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b). Withholding of removal guarantees
only that the person will not be forcibly returned to his or her country of origin
and does not preclude the possibility of being removed to a third country. Id.
§ 1231(b). If removal proceedings are already underway, the applicant can apply
for asylum or withholding only by presenting a defensive application that is heard
exclusively by the IJ. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(b)(3) (2008).
48. See INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (defining “refugee,” but
failing to qualify “persecution”); see also INA § 241(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3)(A).
49. Desir v. Ilchert, 840 F.2d 723, 727 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Kovac v. INS,
407 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir. 1969)).
50. See Fesseha v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 2003). In this case, the
woman was only detained, not imprisoned, was held for only twenty-four hours,
and was never harmed. Id. at 16.
51. See Li Wu Lin v. INS, 238 F.3d 239, 243–44 (3d Cir. 2001).
52. Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993).
53. See McMullein v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312, 1317–18 (9th Cir. 1981).
54. See Zayas-Marini v. INS, 785 F.2d 801, 805–06 (9th Cir. 1986).
55. Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1240.
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some evidence of the persecutor’s motive, whether direct or
56
Yet, the question remains, does persecution
circumstantial.
require a punitive intent? Circuit courts have split on this
57
question. The Ninth Circuit has decided that a broader standard
than mere intent to punish should be utilized in sexual minority
58
cases.
a.

Punitive Intent: The Ninth Circuit

In 1992, Alla Pitcherskaia, a thirty-five-year-old Russian
national, claimed asylum in the U.S. on the ground that she was
59
persecuted in Russia because she was a lesbian. Her claim for
60
asylum was denied. On appeal to the BIA, her claim was again
denied on the ground “that even if her testimony is essentially
credible,” she failed to meet her burden of establishing eligibility
61
for relief under the Act. The BIA majority found that Pitcherskaia
had not been persecuted because “although she had been
subjected to involuntary psychiatric treatments, the militia and
psychiatric institutions intended to ‘cure’ her, not to punish her,
and thus their actions did not constitute ‘persecution’ within the
62
meaning of the Act.”
The issue on appeal to the Ninth Circuit was whether the INA
requires an applicant to prove that the persecutor “harbored a
63
subjective intent to harm or punish” when persecuting the victim.
The court found the BIA’s interpretation of persecution to be
arbitrary, capricious, and manifestly contrary to the statute, which
allowed the court to overrule the BIA’s definition and impose
64
another. The court noted that neither the Supreme Court nor
56. 502 U.S. 478, 483–84 (1992).
57. Monica Saxena, More than Mere Semanitcs: The Case for an Expansive
Definition of Persecution in Sexual Minority Asylum Claims, 12 MICH. J. GENDER & L.
331, 347–49 (2006).
58. See id. at 346–47 (2006) (citing Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d 641, 643 (9th
Cir. 1997)).
59. See Pitcherskaia, 118 F.3d at 643. In her trial, Pitcherskaia recounted that
she had been arrested several times for such things as failing to procure required
permits for a gay-rights protest. Id. at 644. She stated that she suffered further
harassment through forced psychiatric counseling designed to “cure” her
homosexuality. Id.
60. Id. at 645.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 643.
63. Id. at 646.
64. See id. at 647.
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the Ninth Circuit had ever required an asylum applicant to show
that her persecutor had the intention of inflicting harm or
65
punishment.
The court found that the term “punishment”
implied that the perpetrator believed the victim did some wrong or
66
committed a crime—the perpetrator took action in retribution.
Persecution, on the other hand, only required that the persecutor
67
caused the victim suffering or harm.
Although many asylum cases involved situations where the
persecutor had a subjective intent to punish, the court concluded
68
that punitive intent was not required to establish persecution. In
clarifying the new legal standard, the court stated that the
69
definition of persecution is objective.
The court reversed the
BIA’s order and remanded the case to the BIA for reconsideration
70
in light of the opinion.
b.

Punitive Intent: The Fifth Circuit

In Pitcherskaia, the Ninth Circuit recognized persecution as the
infliction of suffering or harm in a way regarded offensive to a
71
reasonable person. In contrast, the Fifth Circuit finds persecution
72
only when the perpetrator acts with intent to punish the victim.
In Pitcherskaia, the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected this punitive
73
intent requirement, which the Fifth Circuit adopted in the 1994
74
decision of Faddoul v. INS.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the BIA’s denial of Faddoul’s
asylum claim and held that persecution required both a showing of
the infliction of harm and intent to punish on one of the five

65. Id. at 648.
66. Id. at 648.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 647.
70. Id. at 648.
71. See id. at 647.
72. See Faddoul v. INS, 37 F.3d 185, 188 (5th Cir. 1994).
73. 118 F.3d at 648 n.9.
74. 37 F.3d at 187. Joseph Faddoul was a thirty-three-year-old man of
Palestinian ancestry who was born and raised in Saudi Arabia. Id. He alleged that
he was persecuted by the Saudi Arabian practice of jus sanguinis, which grants
citizenship rights only to residents of Saudi Arabian ancestry. Id. He alleged
further that as a non-citizen living in Saudi Arabia he would be unable to own
property or businesses or attend the university and, as a result, this constituted
persecution. Id.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss1/12

12

Birdsong: A Legislative Rejoinder to "Give Me Your Gays, Your Lesbians, and

2008]

LEGISLATIVE REJOINDER: GENDER VIOLENCE

209

75

protected grounds set out in the statute. In Faddoul, the court
noted that the claimant received the same rights and was subject to
76
the same discrimination as a Saudi-born Egyptian.
The court
found no evidence that Faddoul had ever been arrested, detained,
77
interrogated, or harmed because of his ancestry.
This distinction in definitions of persecution is especially
important to sexual minorities. In many countries, LGBT persons
may be abused because of their sexuality, yet, the specific intent to
punish is not always present, as in Pitcherskaia.
c.

Punitive Intent: The Seventh Circuit
78

In Sivaainkaran v. INS, the Seventh Circuit adopted a position
that may lie between the Fifth and Ninth Circuits. The court ruled
that an asylum claimant could demonstrate persecution by a
showing of either the persecutor’s motivation to punish or, more
generally, the infliction of harm for one of the five protected
79
grounds of the statute. The court’s use of the word “punishment”
indicates that, unlike earlier holdings, punitive intent is not
80
necessary to satisfy the “infliction of harm” requirement.
The
Seventh Circuit, following a 1970 case from the Sixth Circuit
(which has yet to address the question of punitive intent), employs
81
a dictionary definition of persecution.
Nations have human rights laws to protect their citizens, as
82
well as the citizens of other nations. If nations were allowed to
75. Id. at 188.
76. Id. at 189.
77. Id. at 188–89.
78. 972 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1992).
79. Id. at 165 n.2 (“‘Persecution’ is not defined in the Act, but we have
described it as ‘punishment’ or ‘the infliction of harm’ for political, religious, or
other reasons that are offensive.”).
80. See Saxena, supra note 57, at 349.
81. See, e.g., Zalega v. INS, 916 F.2d 1257, 1260 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing Berdo
v. INS, 432 F.2d 824, 846 (6th Cir. 1970)).
No doubt “persecution” is too strong a word to be satisfied by proof of
the likelihood of minor disadvantage or trivial inconvenience. But
there is nothing to indicate that Congress intended section 243(h) to
encompass any less than the word “persecution” ordinarily conveys –
the infliction of suffering or harm upon those who differ (in race,
religion or political opinion) in a way regarded as offensive. See
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1685 (1965).
Berdo, 432 F.2d at 846.
82. See Universal Declaration on Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N.
Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
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torture their own people to “cure” sexual orientation, it is
83
impossible to know where they will draw the line. The inclusion
of a punishment requirement in the determination of whether to
grant asylum based on persecution should not be feasible in all
84
circuits.
Justice requires that the asylum statute be amended to make
clear that a “punitive intent” need not be required to prove a claim
for persecution.
2.

Social Group

To be eligible for asylum, refugees must belong to a particular
social group if they do not qualify under the other protected
categories of race, religion, nationality, or political opinion. In
1994, the Attorney General designated the Toboso-Alfonso case as
precedent for the proposition that homosexuals who had been
persecuted in their countries of origin could be recognized as a
particular social group in all proceedings involving issues of
85
persecution involving the same issue or issues.
Until 2001, there had been two seemingly conflicting
standards for defining a “particular social group.” The first was the
86
standard derived from the BIA in its 1985 case of In re Acosta. The
BIA held that
“persecution on account of membership in a particular
social group” [meant] persecution that is directed toward
an individual who is a member of a group of persons all of
whom share a common, immutable characteristic. The
shared characteristic might be an innate one such as sex,
color, or kinship ties, or in some circumstances it might
be a shared past experience such as former military
87
leadership or land ownership.
Acosta’s claim for asylum on this ground was denied because his
83. See generally Saxena, supra note 57.
84. Id.
85. Att’y Gen. Order No. 1895-94 (June 19, 1994).
86. 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (1985). In Acosta, the BIA upheld the IJ’s denial of
asylum to a thirty-six-year-old man from El Salvador who was in deportation
proceedings. Id. at 213. Among his claims for asylum was that he was a member of
a particular social group: a group of young taxi drivers in the capital city of San
Salvador in the taxi cooperative known as COTAXI who feared persecution at the
hands of guerrillas who wanted to disrupt the public transportation system of the
country. Id. at 216–17.
87. Id. at 233.
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membership in a taxi cooperative was not an immutable trait.
In 1986, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals departed from the
89
Acosta standard in Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS. The court rejected the
petitioner’s claim of asylum and held that
the phrase “particular social group” implies a collection of
people closely affiliated with each other, who are actuated
by some common impulse or interest. Of central concern
is the existence of a voluntary associational relationship
among the purported members, which imparts some
common characteristic that is fundamental to their
90
identity as a member of that discrete social group.
91
The Ninth Circuit in Hernandez-Montiel v. INS reconciled the
Acosta and the Sanchez-Trujillo definitions of a particular social
group into one expansive standard, holding “that a ‘particular
social group’ is one united by a voluntary association, . . . or by an
innate characteristic that is so fundamental to the identities or
consciences of its members that members either cannot or should
92
not be required to change it.”
88. Id. at 235. The court indicated that Acosta could leave the cooperative,
change jobs, and move to another part of the country and would not be a possible
target of guerilla persecution. Id.
89. 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986). Sanchez-Trujillo involved a claimant from El
Salvador who feared return to his homeland because he believed he might be
drafted by the government there to fight against the guerillas. Id. at 1573. In
deportation proceedings Sanchez-Trujillo sought asylum on the ground he would
be persecuted if deported to El Salvador on account of the fact he was a member
of a “particular social group’ consisting of young, urban, working-class males of
military age who had never served in the military or otherwise expressed support
for the government of El Salvador.” Id.
90. Id. at 1576.
91. 225 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000). Hernandez-Montiel was a native of Mexico
who filed for asylum on the ground that he was persecuted in Mexico on account
of his homosexuality and his female sexual identity, a particular social group. Id.
at 1088. He testified at trial that at the age of eight he realized he was attracted to
people of his same sex and began dressing and behaving as a woman at the age of
twelve. Id. at 1087–88. He faced numerous reprimands from family and school
officials because of his sexual orientation, and was also abused and sexually
assaulted by Mexican police officers. Id. at 1088. He subsequently fled to the
United States where the IJ denied his asylum claim, and the BIA denied his
subsequent appeal. Id. The BIA classified his particular social group as
“homosexual males who dress as females” and found that he did not sufficiently
establish that the abuse he suffered in Mexico was a result of his membership in a
particular social group. Id. The basis of his claim “was that he was mistreated
because of the way he was dressed (as a male prostitute) and not because he was a
homosexual . . . [he] failed to show that his decision to dress as a female was an
immutable characteristic.” Id. at 1090.
92. Id. at 1093 (emphasis in original).
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Hernandez-Montiel defines “particular social group” in a way
that embraces individuals who are actually persecuted—even if they
fail to qualify for asylum under the statute’s other enumerated
93
categories. Such a standard provides a mechanism that meets the
needs of those who do not fit neatly into a particular racial or
religious group, but who are still persecuted on account of
something immutable and fundamental to their persons.
The Ninth Circuit held that it was not just HernandezMontiel’s dress that was critical for the particular social group
94
requirement. Instead, it found that his female sexual identity was
so basic to him that either he could not change it or should not be
95
required to change it.
The implication of such a standard is
readily apparent in asylum claims based on sexual orientation or
gender violence.
The asylum statute should be amended to define “particular
social group” in a way that embraces individuals who are actually
persecuted, even if they fail to qualify for asylum under the statute’s
other enumerated categories. Thus, it would provide a mechanism
that meets the needs of those who do not fit neatly into a particular
racial or religious group but who are still persecuted on account of
something immutable and fundamental to their persons.
B. Lack of Precedent and Published Opinions
The lack of published decisions by United States IJs tends to
make any analysis of trends within the system problematic. Both
the claimant and the government can appeal an IJ’s trial decision
96
The U.S. Attorney General has the authority to
to the BIA.
designate as precedent or overrule any decision made at the BIA
97
level. If unsatisfied with the BIA’s decision, the claimant can then
appeal to the relevant federal circuit court, whose decision will be
98
binding on the BIA in that circuit.
“The [Executive Office for Immigration Review] is authorized
to publish its decisions selectively and thereby establish
93. Id. at 1099 (“We hold that the BIA’s decision denying Geovanni asylum
on statutory grounds is fatally flawed as a matter of law . . .”).
94. See id. at 1094.
95. Id. at 1093–94.
96. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1 (1992).
97. Stuart Grider, Sexual Orientation as Grounds for Asylum in the United States –
In re Tenorio, 35 HARV. INT’L L.J. 213, 215 (1994).
98. Id.
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precedential value for individual BIA level rulings at its
99
discretion.” The practical result of this discretion is that few BIA
100
decisions are released.
One scholar has reported that only about fifty of the four
thousand decisions made each year by the BIA are actually
published. A vast majority of these published cases are
decisions where asylum is denied, which creates a system
in which it is nearly impossible for the [claimant], or the
[IJ], to discern clear standards necessary to establish a
101
successful asylum claim.
This author believes, as do others, that the lack of published
decisions is deliberate. Because we have no substantial body of
published opinions and few precedential decisions, lawyers for
asylum claimants are seldom able to establish, prior to trial, how
and why their clients’ asylum claims may be decided. It is this
author’s further opinion, based upon experience in immigration
court, that the few evidentiary and other standards that have been
established clearly by published precedent or recent administrative
102
guidelines are sometimes ignored by IJs.
IV. GUIDELINES, REGULATIONS, AND “FLOODGATE” PROBLEMS FOR
WOMEN
The Kasinga decision, discussed in the introduction of this
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. I recounted a similar situation in my previous article. Birdsong, supra
note 9, at 381. In Ali v. Ashcroft, the Ninth Circuit overturned a decision by an IJ
denying asylum to a Somali woman who had been raped by militia men of a rival
clan. 394 F.3d 780 (9th Cir. 2005). The men invaded the woman’s home and
killed her brother-in-law, who had tried to prevent the rape. Id. at 783. The IJ
found her ineligible for asylum on the ground that she could not establish past
persecution because "the sole motivation for the murder, detention, and robbery
. . . ‘was shown to clearly be simply to steal, and in case of the rape to take
gratification from the helpless condition of the respondent.’" Id. at 784.
The Ninth Circuit found that the IJ was incorrect when it held that the
rape was for sexual gratification. Id. at 787. The court held that “[s]erious
physical harm consistently has been held to constitute persecution. Rape and
other forms of severe sexual violence clearly can fall [into] this rule.” Id. (quoting
Memorandum from Phyllis Coven, Office of Int'l Affairs, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Consideration for Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims from Women, to
all INS Asylum Officers and HQASM Coordinators (May 26, 1995)). This
particular rule was from a 1995 memorandum to all INS and asylum officers
adjudicating claims from women. Either the IJ had not read this important set of
guidelines or ignored them.
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article, designated FGM as a form of persecution and found that
young Togolese women who had not undergone such process and
103
opposed it could be “a particular social group.”
Despite that
decision, as this article will demonstrate, claims by women seeking
asylum as a result of gender-based violence have not always fared
well. A number of such cases of women seeking asylum from
persecution involved women who had been abused by husbands or
significant other male figures in their lives who had no connection
104
Criticism abounds that granting women
to the government.
asylum based upon such perceived “domestic abuse” on the ground
that they comprise a “particular social group” would open the
“floodgates” of millions of abused women seeking asylum in the
105
United States.
It is this author’s opinion, again, based upon experience in
immigration court, that there will not be a flood of abused women
seeking asylum on domestic abuse grounds. The main reason is
the fact that millions of women worldwide who may be so abused
will unlikely have the resources or wherewithal to make it to the
U.S. to make such asylum claims. Further, the Act already provides
that the filing of frivolous applications of asylum can result in
permanent ineligibility for any other immigration benefits under
106
the Act.
103. In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (1996).
104. See Victoria Neilson, Symposium: Globalization, Security & Human Rights:
Immigration in the Twenty-First Century: Homosexual or Female? Applying Gender-Based
Asylum Jurisprudence to Lesbian Asylum Claims, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 417, 434
(2005) (“This harm, especially at the hand of one’s own family, has not
traditionally warranted protection by the legal system . . .”).
105. See Neilson, supra note 104, at 443:
Anti-immigrant groups, such as the Federation for American
Immigration Reform (FAIR), decry asylum as a ‘back door’ means for
foreign nationals to obtain legal status in the United States without
establishing the family or employment-based ties of other immigration
categories.
Not surprisingly, such groups adamantly oppose the
expansion of asylum categories to include harm based on persecution
that occurs within the private sphere. These advocates fear that such
expansion would lead to a floodgate of asylum seekers in the United
States. This fear is simply unfounded.
See also Ashcroft Re-considers Clinton-Era Asylum Rule, The Dan Stein Report, Mar. 3,
2003, http://www.steinreport.com/archives/001682.html; Stephen M. Knight,
Seeking Asylum From Gender Persecution: Progress Amid Uncertainty, 79 Interpreter
Releases 689, 695 (May 13, 2002).
106. See INA § 208(d)(6) ("If the Attorney General determines that an alien
has knowingly made a frivolous application for asylum and the alien has received
the notice under paragraph (4)(A), the alien shall be permanently ineligible for
any benefits under this Act, effective as of the date of a final determination on
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At least one scholar has advocated that our asylum law should
be amended to allow for a sixth statutory ground for persecution
based on gender (along with race, religion, nationality, political
107
opinion or member of a particular social group).
This new
ground would benefit women seeking asylum from persecution
from non-state sponsored situations such as sexual abuse, rape,
infanticide, genital mutilation, forced marriage, slavery, extreme
domestic violence, honor killings, and forced prostitution.
Interest in such an amendment has gained little traction, and
this article does not espouse the need for a sixth ground. Instead,
there has been a growing recognition in the international
community that women should be allowed to seek asylum from
gender-based violence based on cultural and societal norms of
108
Such recognition first appeared in guidelines
certain countries.
issued by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in
109
1985.
A leading scholar in the area, Karen Musalo, recently
explained it best:
[B]eginning in 1985, UNHCR began to issue different
directives or guidance to countries as to how they could
take that definition [of refugee] and actually not see
obstacles arising from the definition, but rather, analyze
how if you apply that definition in a fair way consistent
with international human rights norms, women would
actually come within the definition of refugee.
One of the things that the UNHCR did in a series of
pronouncements . . . was to suggest that individual
countries issue their own guidelines to guide their
adjudicators on how to understand the refugee definition,
110
in a gender-sensitive context.
In 1993, Canada was the first country to issue guidelines for
adjudicating claims that would protect women fleeing gender-based

such application.").
107. See Elizabeth A. Hueben, Domestic Violence and Asylum Law: The United States
Takes Several Remedial Steps in Recognizing Gender-Based Persecution, 70 UMKC L. REV.
453, 466 (2001).
108. See id. at 463–64 (“Proposed new rules in the United States dealing with
asylum claims of women aim to establish guidelines . . . [t]he proposed rules
restate that ‘gender can form the basis of a particular social group.’”).
109. See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee
Women (1991), available at http://www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/3d4f915e4.pdf.
110. Symposium, Panel One—Empowering Survivors with Legal-Status Challenges,
22 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 304, 305 (2007).
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111

persecution, and the United States followed in 1995 with its own
112
It was not long after the United States
guidelines for women.
adopted its guidelines that the Kasinga case was decided, in which
the BIA found that the ground of a particular social group could be
113
interpreted to include claims defined by gender.
Later in 1995 came the gender violence case that continues to
cause controversy with respect to how we apply asylum law to
women who are subjected to extreme domestic abuse. In In re R-Aa Guatemalan woman, Rodi Alvarado Pena, sought asylum in the
114
United States. She fled her country to escape a husband who, for
at least ten years, had abused her, beaten her, broken a window
and a mirror with her head, kicked her in her vagina when she was
pregnant, raped and sodomized her, and had threatened to kill her
115
116
The police would not help her.
The IJ
if she ever left him.
found her testimony credible and granted asylum on the grounds
that she was a member of “a particular social group,” i.e.,
Guatemalan women who have been involved with Guatemalan male
companions, who believe that women are to live under male
117
domination.
Despite the earlier Kasinga decision, in 1999 the BIA reversed
the IJ’s decision and such reversal was affirmed by the Attorney
118
General.
The BIA held that Guatemalan women who have been
involved intimately with Guatemalan male companions who believe
that women are to live under male domination is not a particular
119
social group.
Absent from this group’s makeup is a voluntary
associational relationship that is of central concern in the Ninth
120
Circuit.
In re R-A- has had a tortured history and is a primer for
111. See IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE BOARD OF CANADA, GUIDELINE 4: WOMEN
REFUGEE CLAIMANTS FEARING GENDER-RELATED PERSECUTION (Nov. 13 1996),
http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/references/policy/guidelines/women_e.htm.
112. See generally Phyllis Coven, Immigration and Naturalization Service Gender
Guidelines: Considerations for Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims from Women, 7
INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 700 (1995).
113. See Symposium—Empowering Survivors, supra note 110, at 307.
114. 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 907 (2001).
115. Id. at 908.
116. Id. at 909.
117. Id. at 911. The IJ found that such a group was cognizable and cohesive, as
members shared the common and immutable characteristics of gender and the
experience of having been intimately involved with a male companion who
practiced male domination through violence. Id. at 911–17.
118. Id. at 906.
119. Id. at 919–20.
120. Id. at 918. The court concluded:

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss1/12

20

Birdsong: A Legislative Rejoinder to "Give Me Your Gays, Your Lesbians, and

2008]

LEGISLATIVE REJOINDER: GENDER VIOLENCE

217

why abused women have more trouble obtaining asylum under the
121
statute than LGBT persons.
Musalo summarizes the tortured history of the In re R-A- case:
[I]n 1999 a majority of the BIA—the same body that had
granted Ms. Kassindja’s case three years earlier—reversed
the immigration judge’s grant of asylum to Rodi Alvarado.
The BIA attempted to distinguish the two cases to justify
the grant in one case and the denial in the other.
The ongoing ambivalency [sic] on the issue of gender
asylum became apparent approximately eighteen months
after the BIA’s decision when the Department of Justice
(DOJ) issued proposed asylum regulations to address
claims of gender persecution. The preamble to the
regulations explicitly states that their purpose is [to]
remove “certain barriers that the In re R-A- decision seems
to pose” to claims for asylum based on domestic violence.
Within a little more than a month of issuing the proposed
[T]he respondent has been the victim of tragic and severe abuse. We
further find that her husband’s motivation, to the extent it can be
ascertained, has varied; some abuse occurred because of his warped
perception of and reaction to her behavior, while some likely arose out of
psychological disorder, pure meanness, or no apparent reason at all . . . .
We are not persuaded that the abuse occurred because of her
membership in a particular social group or because of an actual or
imputed political opinion. We therefore do not find respondent eligible
for asylum.
Id. at 927.
121. Cf. Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991). Earlier, in 1991, a
Salvadoran woman had been denied political asylum as not being in a cognizable
particular social group. Id. at 662. Carmen Gomez had been born in El Salvador
and lived there until she was eighteen. Id. Between the ages of twelve and
fourteen she was raped and beaten by guerilla forces on each of five occasions. Id.
After living in the U.S. for almost a decade, she pled guilty to a sale of a controlled
substance, served time in jail, and was placed in deportation proceedings. Id. She
claimed asylum on the ground of fear of persecution because she was a member of
a particular social group: women who have been previously battered and raped by
Salvadoran guerillas. Id. The IJ denied her claim of asylum, and the BIA affirmed.
Id. at 663. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed her petition on the
ground that Gomez failed to produce evidence that women who have previously
been abused by the guerillas possess common characteristics—other than gender
and youth—that would-be persecutors could identify them as members of the
purported group. Id. at 664.
The BIA further held that there was no indication that Gomez would be
singled out for further brutalization. Id. at 665. The court indicated it did not
suggest that women who have been repeatedly and systematically brutalized by
particular attackers cannot assert a well-founded fear of persecution, but found
that Gomez had not demonstrated that she was any more likely to be persecuted
than any other young woman. Id.
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regulations, then Attorney General Janet Reno took the
unusual step of exercising her authority to review the
decision in In re R-A-. She vacated the denial of asylum,
and sent the case back to the BIA, instructing it to
reconsider the case when the proposed regulations were
122
issued as final.
123
The aforementioned “proposed regulations,” first proposed
in December 2000, have yet to be finalized because finalization
became more complicated under the Homeland Security Act,
124
They
which required reorganization of immigration functions.
were proposed at the end of the Clinton administration, and it is
now almost the end of the Bush administration. Bureaucratic
infighting and opposition by a number of groups with competing
interests may keep the proposed regulations from ever being
finalized. Alvarado’s status still remains in limbo while she awaits a
final end to her odyssey.
The main problem with the proposed regulations appears to
be that they make it more difficult for women like Rodi Alvarado to
obtain asylum than under the current case law. Existing case law
recognizes that once an asylum applicant proves she was
persecuted, she must demonstrate that such persecution was “on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
125
social group, or political opinion.”
Thus, she must establish the
persecutor’s frame of mind. At present it is only necessary for her
to establish that at least one of the protected categories was one of
the motivations, even if it appears that a persecutor had mixed
126
motives for inflicting the persecutory harm. Under the proposed
122. Karen Musalo, The Center for Children, Families, and the Law Interdisciplinary
Conference: "Welcome to America: Immigration, Families, and the Law": Protecting Victims
of Gendered Persecution: Fear of Floodgates or Call To (Principled) Action?, 14 VA. J. SOC.
POL'Y & L. 119, 125 (2007) (internal citations omitted).
123. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588 (Dec. 7, 2000)
(to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208).
124. Musalo, supra note 122, at 128. "Whereas prior to the reorganization, the
regulations were within the sole jurisdiction of the DOJ, they are now within the
joint jurisdiction of the DOJ and the DHS, which means that both agencies will
need to reach some consensus on the regulations before they can be finalized.”
Id. “In the meantime, the . . . [DHS], formerly the INS, which had appealed the
original grant of asylum to Rodi Alvarado and opposed her claim for eight years,
changed its position, filing a brief in February 2004 in which it argued that she was
eligible for recognition as a refugee.” Id. at 126.
125. 8 U.S.C. § 101(a)(42)(A).
126. See Borja v. INS, 175 F.3d 732, 736 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (holding that
“the applicant must produce evidence from which it is reasonable to believe that
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regulations, she must show that the “protected characteristic is
127
central to the persecutor’s motivation” for persecution.
Although this would be a difficult evidentiary bar to hurdle,
another commentator reminds us:
In fact, the proposed rule stresses that applicants may rely
on circumstantial evidence demonstrating “patterns of
violence in the society against individuals similarly situated
to the applicant” in order to establish motive. The INS
reasons that this evidence may reflect a country’s societal
norms and demonstrate the relevant legal system’s
support for the persecutory conduct. According to the
INS, this societal context may help reveal an abuser’s
belief that he possesses the authority to batter and control
his victim “on account of” of her inferior position in the
128
relationship.
Notwithstanding the thorny concerns presented by In re R-A-,
recent cases cited below demonstrate that persecution of LGBT
129
persons, as well as persecution of women who are victims of
the harm was motivated, at least in part, by an actual or implied protected
ground”) (quoting In re T-M-B-, Interim Dec. No. 3307 (BIA Feb. 20, 1997)). See
also Borja, 175 F.3d at 736 (citing Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d 1501, 1509 (9th Cir.
1995) (“persecutory conduct may have more than one motive, and so long as one
motive is one of the statutorily enumerated ground, the requirements have been
satisfied.”)).
127. Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, 65 Fed. Reg.
76,597–98 (Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208).
128. Jenny-Brooke Condon, Comment, Asylum Law's Gender Paradox, 33 SETON
HALL L. REV. 207, 224 (2002) (internal citations omitted).
129. See, e.g., Press Release, Columbia Law School Sexuality and Gender Law
Clinic Secures Grant of Asylum for Lesbian from Turkmenistan (May 1, 2007),
http://www.law.columbia.edu/media_inquiries/news_events/2007/may07/sexual
ity_law. In May 2007 a lesbian from the former Soviet republic of Turkmenistan
was granted asylum. The woman, whose name is being withheld because of fears
of reprisal by the Turkmenistan government against family members still in the
country, had entered the U.S. on a tourist visa and then applied for refugee status.
Although there is no specific law against lesbians in Turkmenistan, they are
discriminated against in employment with few ever getting jobs. In some cases, in
the mostly Muslim country, lesbians are forced by their families into marriages.
See also Shahinaj v. Gonzalez, 481 F.3d 1027 (8th Cir. 2007) (involving an
Albanian homosexual who was beaten by police when he reported election fraud
in an Albanian election); Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2005)
(wherein an "outed" gay, Shi'ite Muslim man from Lebanon, afflicted with AIDS,
was able to reverse an IJ's finding that his fear of future persecution was not wellfounded); Boer-Sedano v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2005) (involving a
Mexican homosexual man who was forced to perform oral sex on a high-ranking
Mexican police officer); Amanfi v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 719 (3d Cir. 2003) (wherein
the court remanded back to the BIA the case of a Ghanaian man who did not
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gender violence, has become increasingly accepted as grounds for
130
It is often easier for LGBT
legal asylum in the United States.
persons to obtain asylum because homosexuals have been certified
as a “social group” for purposes of asylum and usually not required
to make a case by case showing of their status. As In re R-Ademonstrates, it is much more difficult for women who are
persecuted by domestic partners or family members to show that
they are persecuted “on account” of membership in a definite,
distinct social group. The In re R-A- situation can be remedied by
adoption of my fourth proposed amendment recommendation set
forth herein.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
In asylum law, guidelines and regulations provide precedent
for decisions. Guidelines are prevalent but informal and do not
carry the force of law. Regulations are stricter and are normally
131
codified in Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
Implementing regulations often entails long and arduous policy
disputes as well as extended time for comment and criticism by
interested parties and groups. Indeed, the policy disputes over In

identify himself as homosexual but feared persecution in Ghana because there was
evidence that his persecutors imputed to him membership in a "particular social
group" as a homosexual).
130. See, e.g., Ali v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 780 (9th Cir. 2005) (involving a Somali
woman whose brother-in-law was shot and killed in her home while she was being
raped by members of a militia group of a rival clan who opposed Ali's political
beliefs); Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463 (2d Cir. 2003) (involving a claim of
asylum by a twenty-eight year-old woman from the Democratic Republic of the
Congo where she was raped and imprisoned by soldiers during that country’s civil
war in 2000. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded the BIA’s order denying
asylum and withholding of asylum for providing only a minimal analysis of
Zubeda’s claims of degrading treatment or punishment under the Convention
Against Torture); Shoafera v. INS, 228 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2000) (wherein the
claimant, an Ethiopian woman of Amharic ethnicity petitioned for review of her
denial of asylum by the BIA. The Ninth Circuit held that her rape by a
government official of Tigrean ethnicity, who was her boss, was motivated at least
in part by the applicant’s Amharic ethnicity, and that she was persecuted on
account of her nationality and remanded the case to the BIA); Angoucheva v. INS,
106 F.3d 781 (7th Cir. 1997) (involving a Bulgarian woman who claimed asylum
based on past persecution on an account that she was sexually assaulted by a state
security officer, causing her to flee Bulgaria. The Seventh Circuit vacated and
remanded her BIA denial of asylum on the ground that she may have been
persecuted because of her Macedonian nationality).
131. See Aliens and Nationality, 8 C.F.R. §§ 1.1 et seq. (2008).
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132

re R-A- have lasted almost a decade.
It is my suggestion that the proposed regulations be
abandoned altogether as a failed experiment. My solution is to
appeal directly to the U.S. Congress and suggest that it amend and
clarify the basic Act to reflect much of what the asylum law is
intended to do. That is, to provide humanitarian relief to those
fleeing persecution in their home countries whether it be from
persecution based on racial, religious, nationality, social group,
political, or sexual grounds. The amendments suggested herein
should make it less burdensome for LGBT persons and women who
are victims of gender violence to obtain justice in asylum claims.
Thus, such an amendment will well serve to clarify the law for all
asylum seekers.
The Refugee Act has now been a part of the INA for almost
133
thirty years.
Excluding the 1996 amendment recognizing
coercive population measures as a form of persecution based on
134
political opinion, little has been done to modernize the statute in
light of world humanitarian concern regarding persecution of
sexual minorities. Aspects of a number of court decisions which
have interpreted our asylum law should be codified into the INA.
Despite the problems I have raised in this and my earlier
article, it is my opinion, after having represented in immigration
court many persons fleeing persecution, that most immigration
judges use the best of their abilities to reach a just asylum result.
The statute, regulations, and guidelines, however, often do not
provide enough guidance, and in some cases provide conflicting
guidance. I propose changes to our asylum statute by adding five
additional subsections to the general asylum provisions found in
INA § 101(a)(42) that will:
•
Define “persecution” (by synthesizing the holdings of the
Ninth and Third Circuits) as: The objective infliction of suffering or
harm which is subjectively experienced upon those who differ, including, but
not limited to threats to life, confinement, torture and economic restrictions
so severe that they constitute a real threat to life or freedom;
•
Further provide that there be no required showing of punitive

132. See supra text accompanying notes 123–27.
133. The Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102.
134. See Illegal Immigration Reform & Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 601, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(42)) (expanding the definition of refugee to include those persecuted for
resistance to coercive population control methods).
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intent within the meaning of persecution in order to obtain
asylum. The approach of the Seventh Circuit should be adopted,
which provides: “Persecution” may be demonstrated by either showing the
persecutor’s motivation to punish or, more generally, the infliction of harm
on account of the five statutory grounds;
•
Define “particular social group” pursuant to the definition set
out by the Ninth Circuit in Hernandez-Montiel as: A group of persons
united by a voluntary association, or by an innate characteristic that is so
fundamental to the identities or consciences of its members that the members
either cannot or should not be required to change it. The group is recognized
to be a societal faction or is otherwise a recognized segment of the population
in question; members view themselves as members of the group; and the
society in which the group exists distinguishes members of the group for
different treatment or status than is accorded to other members of the society;
•
The statute should recognize, in line with existing
international and current U.S. guidelines for adjudicating women’s
claims, that an asylum applicant may assert that she has suffered
persecution on account of her gender as well as on the other
statutory grounds: The Attorney General shall consider claims of asylum
to women whose claims arise from persecution based upon gender-based
violence that is non-state sponsored such as, but not limited to, sexual
abuse, rape, infanticide, genital mutilation, forced marriage, slavery,
extreme domestic violence, honor killings, and forced prostitution;
•
Provide that the Attorney General: vis-à-vis the BIA, publish
written opinions of each asylum case wherein claims of asylum are granted
on grounds of sexual orientation, gender-based violence and coercive
population control measures.
It is my suggestion that these amendments be added to the
current INA §101(a)(42) as part of the general provisions for terms
and concepts in the Act.
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135

VI. THE MODEL LEGISLATION

A Bill
To amend the Immigration And Nationality Act of 1952, as
amended, so as to provide clear and definitive definitions
regarding all refugees fleeing persecution for political and other
types of humanitarian harms.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representative of the
United States of America in Congress Assembled, That the Immigration
And Nationality Act, as amended INA § 101(a)(42) (8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(42)), is amended by adding at the end of Part A the
following subsections:
Sec. (42) Definitions:
For the purposes of this Act the following definitions,
principles and rules are to be applied:
(1) Persecution is the objective infliction of suffering or harm
which is subjectively experienced or that will be experienced in the
future upon those who differ including, but not limited to threats
to life, confinement, torture and economic restrictions so severe
that they constitute a real threat to life or freedom.
135. INA §101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(42) currently provides in full:
(42)The term "refugee" means (A) any person who is outside any country
of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no
nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually
resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country
because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion, or (B) in such special circumstances as the President
after appropriate consultation (as defined in section 1157(e) of this title)
may specify, any person who is within the country of such person's
nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, within the
country in which such person is habitually residing, and who is
persecuted or who has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion. The term "refugee" does not include any person who
ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of
any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.
For purposes of
determination under this chapter, a person who has been forced to abort
a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary sterilization, or who has been
persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo such a procedure or for
other resistance to a coercive population control program, shall be
deemed to have a well founded fear that he or she will be forced to
undergo such a procedure or subject to persecution for such failure,
refusal, or resistance shall be deemed to have a well founded fear of
persecution on account of political opinion.
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(2) Persecution may be demonstrated by showing by direct or
circumstantial evidence the persecutor’s motivation to either
punish or, more generally, the infliction of harm on account of the
statutory grounds set out in Part A of this section. Punitive intent is
not a necessary requirement for a finding of persecution under this
Act.
(3) A particular social group is a group of persons united by a
voluntary association, or by an innate characteristic that is so
fundamental to the identities or consciences of its members that
the members either cannot or should not be required to change it;
such group may also be recognized as a societal faction or is
otherwise a recognized segment of the population in question;
members view themselves as members of the group; and the society
in which the group exists distinguishes members of the group for
different treatment or status than is accorded to other members of
the society.
The Act will be further amended by adding after Part B of Section
(42) two new subsections as follows:
C. For purposes of determination under this Act, claims that
arise from persecution based upon gender-based violence that is
non-state sponsored such as, but not limited to, sexual abuse, rape,
infanticide, genital mutilation, forced marriage, slavery, extreme
domestic violence, honor killings, and forced prostitution shall be
assessed to determine whether the instance or instances of such
harm amounts to persecution on the basis of the general principles
set out herein.
D. The Attorney General of the United States through the
Board of Immigration Appeals shall publish written opinions of
each asylum case granted wherein such claims are made on grounds
of sexual orientation and/or gender-based violence in Part A and
Part C of this section, or are granted on grounds of any coercive
population program as provided in Part B of this section.
VII. CONCLUSION
“The principle of asylum—allowing foreign nationals into
one’s country because they are persecuted in their homelands—
rests upon an understanding that human beings possess certain
136
The U.S. Congress has
‘rights’ that all nations must respect.”
136. John A. Russ, The Gap Between Asylum Ideals and Domestic Reality: Evaluating
Human Rights Conditions for Gay Americans by the United States’ Own Progressive Asylum

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss1/12

28

Birdsong: A Legislative Rejoinder to "Give Me Your Gays, Your Lesbians, and

2008]

LEGISLATIVE REJOINDER: GENDER VIOLENCE

225

made choices with respect to our asylum law. We have chosen to
grant asylum to those from foreign countries who can show that
they have been persecuted on account of race, religion, nationality,
political opinion or their status in a particular social group. Grants
of asylum on account of such persecution recognize the basic
human rights that all human beings deserve.
Asylum and human rights doctrines are intertwined in that
how a country defines persecution reflects its beliefs about what
137
constitutes humans rights violations.
Persecution of LGBT
persons, as well as persecution of women who are victims of gender
violence, has become increasingly accepted as grounds for legal
asylum in the United States. For persecuted LGBT persons and
women subjected to persecution because of their gender, such
asylum protection represents recognition of their basic rights as
138
human beings.
I urge Congress to implement the recommendations that I
have set out herein and to amend the INA with respect to asylum.
Such an amendment will better allow justice to be served in our
immigration courts with respect to LGBT persons, women victims
of gender violence who seek asylum from sexual persecution, and
all others seeking asylum from persecution. As a humanitarian
nation, we should not be ashamed to paraphrase the words of
Emma Lazarus by saying: Give me your gays, your lesbians and your
victims of gender violence yearning to breathe free of sexual
139
persecution; “I lift my lamp beside the golden door.”

Standards, 4 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L & POL’Y 29, 46 (1998).
137. Id.
138. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights at Article 14 recognizes:
“Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from
persecution.” See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 18, at 564.
139. In 1903, the following poem by Emma Lazarus was inscribed at the base
of the Statue of Liberty:
"Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me.
I lift my lamp beside the golden door!"
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